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Abstract
Program analysis is a technique to reason about pro-
grams without executing them, and it has various ap-
plications in compilers, integrated development envi-
ronments, and security. In this work, we present a
machine learning pipeline that induces a security ana-
lyzer for programs by example. The security analyzer
determines whether a program is either secure or in-
secure based on symbolic rules that were deduced by
our machine learning pipeline. The machine pipeline
is two-staged consisting of a Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNN) and an Extractor that converts an RNN
to symbolic rules.
To evaluate the quality of the learned symbolic rules,
we propose a sampling-based similarity measurement
between two infinite regular languages. We conduct
a case study using real-world data. In this work, we
discuss the limitations of existing techniques and possi-
ble improvements in the future. The results show that
with sufficient training data and a fair distribution of
program paths it is feasible to deducing symbolic secu-
rity rules for the OpenJDK library with millions lines
of code.
1 Introduction
The aim of static program analysis (SPA) is to rea-
son about the behavior of computer programs without
actually running them. One motivation for SPA is en-
capsulated in the famous saying of Djikstra, “Program
testing can be used to show the presence of bugs but
never their absence.” In this paper we show that we
can use machine learning (in particular RNNs) to de-
duce symbolic rules for program analyzers. We would
like to learn symbolic rules that decide whether a pro-
gram is either secure or insecure according to some
RNN
model
Deep learning Reasoning machine
S1
S2Input
data � = �∗|�s∗Program analyzer
Figure 1: Program analyzer induction pipeline.
security coding guidelines. The symbolic rules are an
approximation for the concrete program semantics of
a given program. The generated program analyzer will
have a high but not perfect accuracy since sound and
complete program analysis is an undecidable problem.
Our machine learning pipeline for inducing a pro-
gram analyzer consists of the following components:
(i) a database of programs (ii) representation of a pro-
gram as an abstract state machine (ASM) that con-
denses a program into a state machine reflecting the
semantic properties that are relevant for the security
analysis. Reading along the edges of the ASM each
program path is represented as a sequence of symbols
and labeled as secure or insecure; (iii) the use of recur-
rent neural networks (RNNs) to build a binary clas-
sifier using the labeled paths; (iv) the extraction of
a probabilistic finite state machine from the trained
RNN for generating interpretable rules for the deter-
mining the security status of a program.
Knowledge extractions from RNNs were heavily
studied in the 1990s (Cleeremans et al., 1989; Giles
et al., 1992; Manolios and Fanelli, 1994; Omlin and
Giles, 1996). Due to computational limitation at the
time, the problems were applied to simple recurrent
networks on small languages with few neurons. The
latest rule extraction framework was proposed by Ja-
cobsson in 2006 (Jacobsson, 2006). In contrast, the
study of neural networks (under the deep learning
rubric) has recently received renewed interest. In
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particular, long short-term memory (LSTM) networks
are known to resolve the vanishing gradient program
in previous RNN models enhancing ability of learn-
ing long-term dependencies. Nevertheless, no previ-
ous study has attempted extract rules from the net-
work. Our framework couples a long short term mem-
ory (LSTM) network with Jacobsson’s CrySSMEx (Ja-
cobsson, 2006).
To show the effectiveness of the produced symbolic
rules, we compute the similarity between two symbolic
rule systems with the notion of edit distance. This sim-
ilarity metric is necessary for measuring the quality of
the learned rules. Assume we have a set of sentences
S from a language L. Let Lˆ be the language induced
(using an RNN) from S. Then how do we compare L
and Lˆ? Similarity metric comparing two infinite regu-
lar languages was proposed by Benedikt et al. (2011).
However, the computation of the metric requires dou-
ble exponential time. We propose a sampling-based
similarity comparison that computes the lower bound
in polynomial time complexity.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose the first formulation of a static-
analysis problem in a machine learning frame-
work.
• We use modern deep learning methods for extract-
ing finite state automata.
• We propose a heuristic polynomial time similarity
metric of two infinite regular languages.
• We have carried out a detailed experimental study
on openJDK, consisting of millions of lines of
code.
The remaining of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. We first demonstrate a motivating example in
Section 2. Then, we explain an overview and detailed
implementation in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively.
The details of our lower bound similarity metric are
given in Section 5. In experimental results and eval-
uations are presented in Section 6. Related work is
discussed in Section 7; we conclude in Section 8.
2 Motivating Example
This section provides an intuitive example of learning
security analyzer by example. We demonstrate an in-
duction of a security rules which can be used to classify
secure and insecure programs. A program is secure if
there exists at least one permission check before a se-
curity call; otherwise it is insecure. The question is
whether such a symbolic rule can be learned passively
via examples. An example of two secure programs
and one insecure program in form of abstract state
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Figure 2: Finite state machine examples of two secure
programs and one insecure program.
machines are illustrated in Figure 2. The state ma-
chines have three types of labels: permission check p,
security-relevant call s, and other (transparent) state-
ment t. A program is secure if on all paths from the
start state, 0, to all accepting states there exists at
least one permission check, p, before every security
call, s. Hence, the program in Figure 2(b) is insecure
because there exists a security-relevant call without a
permission check on the LHS path.
Labels along paths in the state machine form strings
that describe behaviors of program paths. In this ex-
ample, the secure paths are pts, tps and tt∗t. The
only insecure path among the three programs is ‘stt’.
Combining knowledge from these limited examples,
the secure behavior maybe induced as a program that
does not begin with the security call, s. This rule only
holds true for the particular examples but may not
hold true for all programs. With more examples, the
more generalized rules can be derived. The regular ex-
pression of this security analysis is L = t∗|p(t|p|s)∗.
The target FSA of our security analysis is shown in
Figure 3.
The security analysis can be reshaped as a regular
language reachability problem (Reps, 1998). Given a
regular language L, a program path is secure if a string
equivalent is in L. However, L is not known ahead of
time. In this paper, we propose a machine learning
pipeline that automatically induces the symbolic rules,
representing as the language L, from user examples.
By tracing along the edges of the state machine,
sets of strings representing secure and insecure behav-
ior can be generated. We train an RNN model as a
binary classifier to detect secure and insecure program
paths. However, the black-box learning model is not
understandable to users and we wish to extract sym-
bolic rules by a reasoning machine (or a rule extrac-
tor). A rule extraction framework takes an RNN model
as its input and performs state space quantization gen-
erating an FSA counterpart of the RNN model. This
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Figure 3: The target finite state machines of our secu-
rity analysis.
FSA is the security analyzer, a meta-program that can
determine whether a programs is secure, thus, mak-
ing the property of secure program understandable to
users.
3 System Overview
The overview of our inductive reasoning pipeline using
recurrent neural networks is depicted in Figure 4 (a).
Neural network is unable to take user programs as in-
put directly. Programs often contain excessive infor-
mation to the target analysis which may dominate the
important features during training. Hence, they must
be converted to abstract state machines (ASMs) re-
moving inessential information to the analysis. The re-
maining relevant information is then encoded as tran-
sition labels on the ASM. Hence, tracing ASM forms a
set of strings describing behavior of the program with
respect to the analysis. The program paths in strings
and their classifications as positive or negative exam-
ples are used as an input dataset to RNN. We model
RNN as a binary classifier that predicts whether ex-
ecution paths are accepted or rejected by the analy-
sis. We consider a binary classifier because our sym-
bolic rules, represented as a regular language, have two
output states: accepting and rejecting. Through the
training, we expect the rules to be captured within the
learned RNN model. However, the model may not be
understandable to users. We apply a rule extractor as
our reasoning machine, which quantize the continuous
state space of RNN to a discrete state machine. The
output rules, in a regular expression, derives a new
and reusable program analyzer.
In practice, customizing ASM labels and classifying
validity of program paths are subjective to the analysis
aspects. Automated classifications of program paths
are a challenge problem by itself and is not covered in
this paper. Hence, the decisions should be made by
users. To evaluate, we consider a closed experimental
setup where the program analyzer is known ahead-of-
time. Consequently, we replace user inputs with our
input generator as depicted in Figure 4 (b). The input
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Figure 4: The (a) practical setup and (b) experimental
setup of the program analyzer induction pipeline.
generator randomly generates dataset according to the
pre-defined rules. As the result is known beforehand,
the soundness of learning can be evaluated using simi-
larity measurement. Because there exists no solutions
that compare two different grammars in reasonable
computable time (De la Higuera, 2010), we propose a
similarity metric that calculate a lower bound editing
ratio between two regular languages in Section 5.
4 Inductive Reasoning
In this section, we explain each process our static an-
alyzer induction pipeline in greater details.
Abstract State Machines: The source pro-
grams represented as control flow graphs may capture
irrelevant information to the analysis. For instance,
only permission checks and security calls are applica-
ble to the security analysis. We simplify information
by converting to a more concise representation, namely
an abstract state machine (ASM). Unlike the conven-
tional CFG, an ASM encodes basic blocks as labels on
the edge. Only basic blocks of interests are labeled.
The information of other basic blocks are abstracted
out and considered as transparent edges, t. The labels
are problem specific, and thus, are specified by users.
In the security analysis, we are only interested in per-
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mission check and security call statement; hence, the
labels are p and s, t. Traversing along an ASM gener-
ates strings representing program paths. It should be
noted that there may be an infinite set of strings due
to loops. We sample strings from all ASMs and used
as an input to our RNNs.
Recurrent Neural Networks: Rule extraction
from RNNs (refer as RNN-RE) has been actively stud-
ied in the 1990s (Giles et al., 1992; Cleeremans et al.,
1989; Watrous and Kuhn, 1991; Omlin and Giles, 1996;
Giles et al., 1989; Manolios and Fanelli, 1994). With
the computational limitation at the time, the rules
were extracted from simple recurrent networks with
few hidden states. The networks are trained with a
handful of training data, and repeatedly trained in a
high number of iterations. Moreover, early RNN mod-
els have a problem of vanishing gradients; as a result,
the influence of early terms are overshadowed by the
later terms in a long sequence. With recent advent of
neural networks, we choose to use a long short-term
memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent unit (GRU), a
variation of LSTM, as our hidden layer than they are
able to capture long-term dependency. This is the first
work that applies rule extraction on LSTM/GRU mod-
els. We implement our neural network with three lay-
ers: input, LSTM/GRU and output layer. One char-
acter is fed to the network at a single time sequence.
The binary classifier predicts whether a string ends in
an accepting state; thus, the output layer has a dimen-
sionality of one. The input layer, I, is a binary vector
of L symbols, where |Σ| = L. At most one index of
the input vector can have the value of one. The input
layer is connected to an LSTM layer, S of N neurons.
Only the hidden layer of the last time step, St, is used
to predict the outcome. We discuss the configuration
of the RNN and its trade-off with respect to rule ex-
tractions in more details in Section 6.
Reasoning Machine: RNN can be described
similar to a Mealy machine (Jacobsson, 2005) with
a hidden state transition and output transition from
a given input. In contrast, RNN states are in con-
tinuous space and has computational power of Tur-
ing equivalent (Siegelmann and Sontag, 1992). The
hypothesis behind FSA extraction from RNN is that
after sufficient network training, the network’s state
space clearly diverges, and clusters of state vectors
correspond to a state of an FSA. The rule extraction
commonly share the following steps: generating hidden
states and outputs by feeding input patterns, cluster-
ing and discretize the continuous state space of RNN
to FSA, establish state transitions and minimize FSA
states. A comprehensive survey and compilation of
open issues of the early works are summarized in (Ja-
cobsson, 2005).
The early rule extractions give equal weight to ge-
ometric properties of the state space. However, the
geometric distance does not directly reflect the impact
to the network as a result of feedback loops within
the network. Jacobsson (Jacobsson, 2006) proposed
Crystallising Substochastic Sequential Machine Ex-
tractor (CrySSMEx) which takes into account this prop-
erty. Given RNN’s inputs, internal states and outputs,
CrySSMEx extracts a probabilistic finite state machine.
Initially, CrySSMEx constructs a machine,M, with the
entire state space as a single non-deterministic FSM
state. At each iteration, it first selects the most non-
deterministic states based on the probability. Then
state quantizer is updated by splitting the RNN state
space of the corresponding states. The machine M is
updated with the new state quantizer, before merging
equivalent states.
The state quantizer arranged in tree structure where
each node and its level describes split region in the
state space. The extraction process terminates when
all states in M, are deterministic, or an iteration lim-
itation is reached. The state machine M represents
the learned rules extracted from RNN.
5 Similarity Metric
The quality of learned knowledge is imprinted with
propagated errors from approximations in both RNN
modeling and discretization in the rule extraction. The
imprecisions in RNN are largely caused by three fac-
tors: a size of training examples, a size of hidden lay-
ers and a duration of training. Rule extractions clus-
ter the continuous state space of RNN models. The
computational power of the network is reduced from
Turing-equivalent to a finite state machine and thus,
it propagates further errors to the output FSA. The
error introduced throughout the program analyzer in-
duction pipeline may constitute in the learned FSA.
None of the previous studies in rule extractions have
comparison metrics to evaluate the learned rules.
In order to evaluate the quality of learning, we con-
struct a control setup (Figure 4(b)) where inputs are
generated from known rules. In this control setup, the
quality of learning can be evaluated by comparing the
similarity between the original rules and the learned
rules expressed as infinite regular languages.
Benedikt et al. (2011) proposed an algorithm calcu-
lates the normalized traveling cost between languages
with infinite strings. However, the algorithm is com-
putable in double exponential time complexity. We
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propose a similarity metric that calculate a lower-
bound cost of traveling between the learned FSA and
the target FSA. Given two regular languages LA and
LB , the traveling cost is defined by
δ(LA, LB) = max
{
edit(w,LB)
|w| : ∀w ∈ LA
}
. (1)
We extend the edit-distance calculation between a
word and a regular language (Wagner, 1974) to the
traveling cost between two regular languages. The
traveling cost is the maximum edit ratio from words
in LA to LB . The lower editing cost reflects higher
similarity, and the edit cost of zero indicates that LB
contains all strings of LA (i.e., LA ⊆ LB). Hence, we
refer to this ratio as dissimilarity ratio. It is impor-
tance to note that the edit-distance between two lan-
guages is not symmetric. Considering LA ⊂ LB , there
exist words that accepted by language LB but not LA.
Thus, δ(LA, LB) < δ(LB , LA) Hence, our dissimilarity
ratio is formulated as follows:
∆(LA, LB) = max(δ(LA, LB), δ(LB , LA)). (2)
The range of dissimilarity ratio is [0,∞]. When
∆(LA, LB) is zero, the two languages are equivalent.
The dissimilarity ratio can be above one when the
number of edits is larger than the length of the given
word. It should be noted that the ratio of one does not
necessary mean that the entire word must be edited.
Considering LB = (abc)
∗, transforming aa ∈ LA to
LB requires two edits for replacing the second a with
b and inserting c. Thus, it has dissimilarity ratio of 1.
It is impossible in practice to compare two infinite
languages. We approximate the lower-bound by taking
word samplings from language LA.
δ̂(LA, LB) = max
{
edit(ŵ, LB)
|ŵ| : ∀ŵ ∈ L̂A ⊆ LA
}
,
(3)
Since δ̂(LA, LB) ≤ δ(LA, LB), δ̂(LA, LB) is the upper
lower bound of the travelling cost.
Editing one word, w, to a language with Q states has
a time complexity of O(|w| · |Q|3). Our lower-bound
cost computation operates on sample strings, and thus,
has the complexity of O(|ŵ| · |Q|3 · |L̂A|). To avoid mis-
interpretation in lower-bound comparison, we generate
a large set of strings to examine the similarities. For
each language, we generate 10,000 unique strings.
This metric is only suitable to evaluate learned FSA
to one target regular language. The edit ratio should
not be used to compare language similarity of two dif-
ferent problems. A language with a longer shortest
non-accepting string is likely to have lower ratio. For
example, a regular grammar accepts strings that do
not contain three consecutive zeros. The shortest non-
recognisable string is 000 of length three. The maxi-
mum edit ratio of this language is 13 by editing one of
0’s to 1. On the other hand, in the security analysis,
s is the shortest incorrect path. Hence, the maximum
ratio is 1. Therefore, the edit-ratio cannot be used
to cross-evaluate the similarities of two different prob-
lems.
The necessity of similarity metric in a control setup
is self-evident. In the practical setup (Figure 4(a)),
where the analysis rules are not known, the similarity
metric can be employed to select the best representa-
tive rules. Training RNN with various configurations
produces different models as inputs to the rule extrac-
tor and may eventually induce different symbolic rules.
Regardless of differences in learning, all results are in-
duced from the same set of execution traces, and they
attempt to express the same knowledge captured in
RNN models. Hence, we consider the best representa-
tive rule as a language that has the highest similarity
to all other learned rules.
We conduce a pairwise comparison matrix among
all learned rules where each row represents dissimilar-
ity ratio of a rule to all others. The mean value of
each matrix row represents an average similarity of a
solution. The best representative rules is the rule with
the lowest average dissimilarity ratio (i.e., the highest
similarity).
6 Case Study
We are interested in the quality of induction with re-
spect to neural network configurations, especially, the
minimal learning requirements to retrieve knowledge.
For evaluation purpose, we conduct closed environ-
ment experiments where the symbolic rules are known
ahead of time. Our symbolic rules, in form of FSA over
Σ = {t, p, s}, is depicted in Figure 3. In the experi-
ments, we induce the security analyzer from synthetic
inputs and then extend to real-world datasets.
In RNN training, we configure the neural network
as follows. The hidden layer contains 4 to 32 neu-
rons. The output layer of our neural network is a bi-
nary value representing accepting and rejecting state;
hence, we use a binary cross-entropy (BCE) as our er-
ror criterion. Each training runs up to 5000 epochs.
For verification, the learned models are evaluated with
10,000 random strings.
We use CrySSMEx framework as our reasoning ma-
chine to extract FSA from an RNN. This rule extrac-
tion framework recognizes an initial state as function
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Figure 5: Rule extraction of the security analysis ex-
ample as variations of neural network sizes, N, and a
number of epochs, Ep.
to view the domain, and thus does not consider the
initial state in the computation. We assign the initial
state as a state such that achieves the highest accu-
racy on the training data. CrySSMEx terminates when
a deterministic solution is found. In practice, the de-
terministic solution may not be found in reasonable
time. Hence, we retrieve a non-deterministic solution
by restricting the maximum execution iterations.
6.1 Synthetic Experiment
We randomly generate secure and insecure input
strings from the target FSA following Figure 3. The
generated strings are unique and divided into a train-
ing set and a test set. As RNN has proven much suc-
cess in natural language processing, it is not surprising
that RNN models achieve very high accuracy with few
neurons. However, the rule extraction is very sensitive
to correctness in RNN models. Overfitting and under-
fiting may lead to unsuccessful induction. We demon-
strate the fact by training RNN with 800 positive and
negative examples. Figure 5 shows learned FSAs with
respect to a number of epochs and sizes of the hidden
layer. The extractions at 500 and 1,000 epochs with
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Figure 6: LSTM and GRU network comparisons with
400 and 1000 training data set. GRU models show
lower misclassifications and dissimilarity ratios.
4 and 8 neurons are incorrect due to underfitting. On
the other hand, the rule extractor failed to induce the
rules correctly at 16 neurons and over 500 epochs as
a result of overfitting. RNN models memorize pat-
terns of training examples instead of induce the solu-
tion. The results show that the correct solutions can be
extracted from particular network setups. Reduction
of overfitting effects potentially improves the language
extraction.
Training set: We carried out a comparison be-
tween LSTM and GRU. The networks are trained with
400 and 1,000 examples and verified with 10,000 pro-
gram paths. Misclassification percentages and dissim-
ilarity ratios are shown in Figure 6. The lower values
on the graphs are preferable. When dissimilarity ratio
is zero, the framework is able to induce the expected
rules. Figure 6. With insufficient training data, the
quality of knowledge extraction decreases noticeably.
The learning in both GRU and LSTM models improve
as the training data set increased to 1,000. The larger
training set covers wider range of program examples,
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Figure 7: Validation errors and dissimilarity measure-
ment of 16-neuron GRU networks using dropouts.
and thus, is better represent the target rules. Hence,
more consistent extraction results are shown in the
larger data set with a tradeoff of training time.
LSTM versus GRU: We have observed that GRU
requires smaller training data than LSTM to success-
fully perform rule induction. With 400 examples, GRU
clearly out-performs LSTM as correct solutions cannot
be extracted from LSTM models but can be extracted
from GRU models with four neurons. With 1,000 ex-
amples, both LSTM and GRU can eventually learn
the language at any size of hidden states with few ex-
ceptions in the early stage of training in LSTM. GRU
shows a better performance than LSTM as it has fewer
parameter to be trained. Our results align with previ-
ous study (Irie et al., 2016) that GRU achieved slightly
better results than LSTM with smaller networks.
Regularizations: To reduce the overfitting, we
tune our neural networks by adding a dropout layer
to the input layer. We apply 0%–10% dropouts to
GRU networks consisting 16 hidden states. The net-
works are trained with 400 examples. This model is
overfit when no dropout is applied. Regularization im-
proves the consistency of rule extraction; 1% and 2%
of dropout eliminate the overfitting problem as shown
in Figure 7. The learning is highly sensitive to dropout
percentages as more noise is introduced. The optimal
dropout percentage is problem-oriented and may not
hold true in different analysis.
Rule induction metrics: We evaluate learning
accuracy of each pipeline stages using a test dataset.
The output FSA is evaluated against the target FSA
using similarity metric proposed in Section 5. An over-
lay of the similarity metric and machine learning accu-
racy are depicted in 8. Learning errors in RNN propa-
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Figure 8: Error propagations over the learning process
in a 16-neuron GRU model using 5% dropout .
gates to rule extractions. The trend of CrySSMEx’s er-
rors follows those of RNN’s. Few exceptions, when the
reasoning machine failed to extract RNN, generates
steep spikes. The dissimilarity ratio reflects closely the
errors in the rule extraction. We have observed that
when an RNN model accurately predict the test set
(i.e., < 0.01% inaccuracy), the rule extractor is able
to extract the correct language. The rule extractor is
very fragile to error in the RNN.
6.2 OpenJDK
We further study the viability of our framework in
a practical setup by studying caller-sensitive method
(CSM) security vulnerabilities (Cifuentes et al., 2015)
in OpenJDK 7 dataset. A CSM is said to have a secu-
rity bug if it is reachable from an untrusted source and
exists no permission checks before the CSM. We con-
struct ASM representation of OpenJDK’s CFG using a
datalog programming tool. Out-edges from CSM, per-
mission checks and other basic blocks are labeled as s,
p and t respectively. CFG of OpenJDK contains sev-
eral entry and exit points. Hence, we introduce an ar-
tificial start and end node that connected to the entry
and exit respectively. The end node has an out-edge to
the start node which allows the simulation of multiple
OpenJDK library calls from untrusted sources. We ap-
ply the following assumptions: all valuables from un-
trusted sources are tainted, and the method is context
insensitive. These may introduce false positive cases
that may not reflect actual security bugs in OpenJDK.
The ASM contains 1.5 million reachable edges from un-
trusted sources. Trances of OpenJDK paths generate
inputs for RNN. Each input is classified as secure or
insecure according to the security specifications. To
avoid infinite loops ASM while tracing, we compute k-
th shortest paths from the start node to CSM methods
and then to the end node.
Figure 10 shows that program paths in OpenJDK
heavily bias with a low probability of having permis-
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Figure 9: Rule extraction results from OpenJDK
dataset
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Figure 10: Markov chain
sion checks, p, whereas the synthetic benchmark is
nearly uniform distributed. The low probability lim-
its learning ability of RNN. The imbalance distribution
can be mitigated by improve a loss function or improve
positive to negative sample ratios. The former option
reduce the generality of the framework as the updated
loss function becomes application specific. The latter
option is feasible as the ASM of OpenJDK is known.
We restrict 30% of training data are positive samples.
With improved distribution, symbolic rule induction
is feasible.
Similar to the synthetic experiment setup, the GRU
model is trained with 1,000 training data and 1%
dropout. Figure 9 shows the induced FSA of RNN
using four and eight neurons. We have conducted the
experiments for 16 and 32 neurons, but no FSA could
be extracted within the time limit. Figure 11 depicts
learning accuracy in RNN and similarity of the tar-
get FSA. Comparing to the synthetic experiment (see
Figure 6 with 1,000 training data), it is more difficult,
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Figure 11: Error in classification and dissimilarity met-
ric of OpenJDK.
but possible, to induce the correct symbolic rules. The
lower degree of learning is the result of certain behav-
ior in actual programs. For instead, there exists 13
chance of p followed by s in the synthetic benchmark
but does not hold true in OpenJDK. The patterns are
encoded in RNN and later results in erroneous rules.
Moreover, we have observed that the correct symbolic
rules can only be learned from RNN models with no
misclassifications
In short, learning symbolic rules from real-world
dataset is feasible with sufficient training data and fair
distribution of example. The existing rule extraction
tool is sensitive to error in RNN models. Hence, high
accuracy in RNN training is required for a successful
induction.
7 Related work
Grammatical inferences have been widely studied since
the 1970s. A thorough survey on grammatical infer-
ences was conducted by De la Higuera (2010). A
active learning solution to regular language inference
has been introduced by Angluin (Angluin, 1987). The
algorithm constructs a regular language by using mem-
bership queries asking an oracle, who answers if a
string belong to the target language, and supply coun-
terexamples, otherwise. PAC learning model (Valiant,
1984) approximates a DFA with high probability from
random examples with an assumption on an example
distribution. Learnability of PAC under any distribu-
tions is considered to be too restrictive. Muggleton
et al. (2014) proposes using abduction in inductive
8
logic programming for grammar inferences.
The early noticeable works in this area (Giles et al.,
1992; Cleeremans et al., 1989; Watrous and Kuhn,
1991) discover FSA from a simple recurrent network
with an assumption that after sufficient training, the
network’s state space clearly diverges and clusters of
the state vectors correspond to a state of an FSA.
Kolen (1994) gives a thorough examination to the past
techniques and address two critical problems. First,
sensitivity to the initial conditions which may give
fault illusion of the outcome. Second, trivial changes
in observation strategies can cause one to induce be-
havior. An RNN state control behavior of current and
future events. Thus, a small distance in the state space
may give larger impact to the network functionality
than a large distance.
Jacobsson (2006) has shown that CrySSMEx can ex-
tract FSA from a context free language, anbn. Also
Frank and Jacobsson (2010) applied the rule extrac-
tions on echo state networks that learn word predic-
tion. With renewal interests of deep-learning in the re-
sent decade, RNN models, including LSTM and GRU
have been greatly refined. Rule extraction algorithm
has yet been evaluated on recent RNN models.
Mou et al. (2016) introduces a tree-based convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) for analysis of abstract
syntax tree. Each tree node is encoded in a vector with
a numeric representation. By learning ASTs of pro-
grams from open judge system, the tree-based deep-
learning can classify programs by features. Montavon
et al. (Montavon et al., 2017) proposed deep Taylor de-
composition that explains contributions of input data
to the classification decision. The algorithm traverses
a trained network backward from the output layer to
reveal how decisions were made. Zaheer et al. (2016)
develop a static analyzer induction framework for a
toy language. The framework learns program prop-
erties through LSTM and extracts rules using differ-
entiable set. Bielik et al. (2017) take a different ap-
proach. They induce static analyzers using synthesis
algorithm then generalize learn analyze by querying
counterexample from an oracle.
Recently, there has been interested in learning pro-
gram analysis using probabilistic models. Raychev et
al. (2015) propose a new framework that uses condi-
tional random fields to predict program facts. The
framework is trained by Big Code, programs in large
code repositories, such as GitHub. This prediction en-
gine is used in JSNice to predict variable names and
types in context of JavaScript. Long et al. (2016)
a patch generation system using probabilistic model,
which learns the correct code from human-written
patches to fix new program bugs.
8 Conclusion
While neural networks and deep learning provide high
predictive accuracy, the induced models are not “ex-
plainable”. Our machine learning pipeline extracts a
reasoning machine from an RNN to make models ex-
plainable. It includes (i) modeling program behavior
from examples and (ii) extacting symbolic rules, in
form of a regular language, from the RNNs using a
probabilistic finite state machine. The output program
analyzers analyze potential errors in other programs.
We present a sampling-based similarity measurement
between two regular languages to evaluate the robust-
ness of the learning pipeline. Our case study shows
a successful induction of the security analzyer using
LSTM and GRU models when sufficient training data
and fair distribution of program paths are provided.
However, we have observed that the rule extractions
from RNNs is very sensitive to model accuracy. Im-
provements in rule extraction is needed to induce more
complex analysis.
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